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ARGUMENT
The

District

Court Erred

BV Concluding

Stegall

Proved

A Violation Of His Due Process

Rights

A.

Introduction

Because Stegall presented no evidence
request to

make

t0 arrange

independent

and the

a phone call

state did not

BAC

deny

due process. (Appellant’s

knew

that the jail ofﬁcer to

0r should have

testing (or

any other

known

that the

right), there

whom he directed his

purpose of the

was no bad

faith

call

was

involved

Stegall access t0 potentially exculpatory evidence in Violation of

brief, pp. 4-8.) Stegall

argues

that,

under Idaho precedent, when

a jailer denies a prisoner’s request for a phone call a due process Violation occurs even if
the jailer does not

invoke a

right,

(Respondent’s

know

0r have reason t0

know that the purpose 0f the requested call

is

to

such as arranging for evidentiary testing or consulting with an attorney.
brief, pp. 6-9, 11-14.)

This argument

not g0 so far as t0 say denial 0f a requested phone call
access t0 evidence.

fails

is

because Idaho precedent does

alone enough t0

show

a denial of

Moreover, Stegall’s interpretation 0f that precedent as so holding

is

directly at

odds with controlling precedent of the Supreme Court 0fthe United States which

states that

due process

evidence
in

bad

is

is

exculpatory

violated

When the

or, if 0f unknown

state denies access t0

evidence only Where that

exculpatory value, where the denial 0f access

is

faith.

Stegall also argues that the precedent of the

Supreme Court 0f the United

States is

inapplicable because this case does not involve “spoliation.” (Respondent’s brief, pp. 9-

11.)

by

The

the

test for

When

state denial

Supreme Court of

0f access to evidence violates due process articulated

the United States

is

applicable to the state’s alleged denial of

access t0 evidence in this case. Stegall’s argument that this case

is

in a category other than

state denial

of access to evidence, a category unaddressed by the Supreme Court,

is

without

merit.

Application of the correct legal standards shows no due process Violation under the
facts

of

this case.

Therefore, the district court erred

by granting

based 0n evidence showing only that Stegall’s request for a phone

the

call

motion

to suppress

was not

granted, but

not showing that state ofﬁcials had any reason t0 believe that the underlying purpose of the

requested phone call was t0 pursue a right, as opposed to

make

a communication unrelated

t0 a constitutional right.

Contrary T0 Stegall’s Argument, Idaho Precedent Does Not Require

B.

A Conclusion

Than What Would Be Reached BV Applying Precedent Of The Supreme
Court Of The United States

Different

To safeguard

the due process right t0 present a complete defense, the

Supreme

Court of the United States “has developed ‘what might loosely be called the area of
constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence.”

485

(1984)

(1982)).

(quoting

Within

this

United

States

V.

California V. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,

Valenzuela—Bernal,

458

U.S.

area 0f constitutionally guaranteed access t0 evidence

prosecution’s “constitutional obligation t0 report to the defendant and to the

whenever government witnesses

lie

under oath,” Li

(citing

Napue V.

Illinois,

269-272(1959)); the government’s obligation t0 disclose “evidence that
t0 the guilt

V.

its

0f the defendant 0r relevant t0 the punishment t0 be imposed,”

Magland, 373 U.S.

83,

is

fall

trial

the

court

360 U.S. 264,

either material

Li. (citing Br_ady

87 (1963)); and the prohibition 0n a government’s “exercise[

sovereign powers so as to hamper a criminal defendant’s preparation for

486.

867

858,

trial,”

of]

I_d.

at

However, before the government has a due process duty
t0

to take afﬁrmative steps

preserve evidence, that “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was

apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be 0f such a nature that the defendant

would be unable
at

489.

Where

to obtain

comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Li

the evidence

is

not of exculpatory value that

is

“‘potentially useful,” destruction 0f such evidence “does not Violate

criminal defendant can

show badfaith 0n

the part 0fthe police.

U.S. 544, 547-48 (2004) (emphasis original) (quoting Arizona
51, 58 (1988)). This

due process standard, that there

is

”’

V.

apparent, but

is

only

due process ‘unless a
Illinois V. Fisher,

540

Youngblood, 488 U.S.

no due process Violation unless the

unpreserved evidence in question either has apparent exculpatory value or the government
acted in bad faith, applies even if there

n0 bad

faith in destruction

is

a discovery request for the evidence. Li. (holding

0f cocaine that served as underlying basis for charge under facts

0f the case).
Stegall did not prove that the state denied his right t0

access to additional evidence 0f his

BAC.

First,

due process by denying him

he did not prove that the evidence that

would have been preserved through timely independent testing “possess[ed] an exculpatory
value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed.” Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489.

denied him access t0 evidentiary

Second, he did not prove that the

state

unknown exculpatory value

faith.

in

bad

a phone call With knowledge that call

Youngblood, 488 U.S.

was

at 58.

BAC

of

Although denial of

to invoke the statutory right t0 testing or to

invoke the constitutional right t0 counsel would have established bad
presented no evidence that the jailers of

testing

whom

he requested the phone

faith,

call

Stegall

were ever

informed 0f its purpose. Rather, he presented evidence only that he requested to make a

phone

an unknown purpose.

call for

Because there was no showing the unpreserved

evidence was exculpatory or that preservation was denied in bad
set forth

by

the

Supreme Court 0f the United

and Stegall does not argue otherwise.

States, there

(E Respondent’s

faith,

under the standards

was no due process Violation—
brief.)

Rather than address the precedents 0f the Supreme Court of the United States,
Stegall relies

on precedent from the Idaho Court of Appeals, primarily

Idaho 181, 911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1995). (Respondent’s

State V. Carr, 128

brief, pp. 6-9, 11-14.

1)

That case,

however, does not establish a standard different from the one established by the Supreme
Court. In

C&r, the defendant ﬁrst asked the

was being given

arresting ofﬁcer to call an attorney

the implied consent rights advisory and then repeated the request

being placed in a holding

cell.

Cir, 128 Idaho

at 182,

911 P.2d

let

her

make

the

phone

calls.

”’
I_d.

The

at 775.

ofﬁcer told her that “she could ‘make any phone calls as soon as the

ready to

when

jail

she

when

arresting

personnel were

Her subsequent requests ofj ail personnel were

rebuffed for ﬁve hours. Li. The Idaho Court of Appeals noted that the district court had

held that ofﬁcers “unconstitutionally infringed upon Carr’s right t0 counsel under the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments” and held “that Carr was denied her right t0 due process under
the Fourteenth

1

Amendment 0fthe United States Constitution.”

Li. at 183, 91

244 P.3d 630

1

P.2d

at

776.2

App. 2010).
(Respondent’s brief, pp. 5-8, 13-14.) In Jacobson the defendant asked for a second phone
call (after contacting a bail bondsman) but was denied because of his unruly behavior.
Jacobson, 150 Idaho at 133, 44 P.3d at 632. If anything, Jacobson reinforces the state’s
argument that a denied request for a phone call alone is insufﬁcient t0 establish a due
process Violation and that the jailer’s behavior is an important and relevant consideration.
2

Stegall also cites t0 State V. Jacobson, 150 Idaho 131,

Nothing

in Carr suggests the Idaho Court

process standard.

(Ct.

0f Appeals was applying a different

state

due

Cir,

In

then, the defendant asked the arresting ofﬁcer, in the course of being

notiﬁed of rights (including the right t0 independent

The

arresting ofﬁcer assured her that the jailers

The

jailers,

could

testing), if she

would allow her

call

her attorney.

t0 contact her attorney.

however, delayed that contact for ﬁve hours despite repeated requests. This

violated both Carr’s right t0 counsel and due process.

In contrast, here Stegall did not

request a phone call from the arresting ofﬁcer, did not request a phone call in the context

of his rights notiﬁcation, and did not request t0 contact an attorney. Rather, he asked a

phone

jailer for a

call at

some time

inform the jailer the purpose of the

0n notice

that Stegall

and the

If Stegall

phone

call,

call.

was attempting

the conclusion that asking

to counsel

after

right t0

were

any

he had been processed into the

In contrast t0

t0 exercise

state ofﬁcial for a

jail.

He

did not

C&r, the government was never put

any known

phone

call

right.

Oﬂ does not support

Without more violates the right

due process.

correct,

and

Which request does not

Cir does

stand for the proposition that a request for a

alert the state

alone sufﬁcient to trigger due process,

it

agent t0 an attempt to invoke a right,

is

cannot be reconciled with controlling precedent

0f the Supreme Court. The due process governmental duty to preserve evidence triggers
Trombetta, 467 U.S.

only where the evidence has apparent exculpatory value.

Where, as here, there
if it

n0 apparent exculpatory value, the

denies access to evidence in bad

be accused of bad

was

is

faith

faith.

state violates

Youngblood, 488 U.S.

Where Stegall did not inform anyone

at 58.

The

call

was an attempt t0

assert a right is alone a Violation

state

cannot

make

a call

be distinguished, and in

holds that an ofﬁcer’s act 0f denying a phone call without any reason to

phone

489.

due process only

that his desire t0

related to an attempt t0 preserve evidence. If C&r cannot

at

know

fact

that the

of due process, such a holding

is

entirely incompatible with controlling precedent of the

States

and cannot be followed

E

in this case.

Supreme Court of the United

State V. Rawlings, 159 Idaho 498, 505-06,

363 P.3d 339, 346-47 (2015) (opinions of lower court in conﬂict With controlling opinions
0f higher court are of no
430, 436 (2004) (court

effect);

ﬂ

may overrule

also State V. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 823, 103 P.3d

its

own precedent when

Supreme Court precedent deﬁning the due process
no duty

that there is

to preserve evidence unless

denial of access to evidence of

done

bad

in

been provided by additional

right

BAC

was denied access
evidence 0f

testing,

wrongly decided).

0f access t0 evidence holds

has apparent exculpatory value and that

unknown exculpatory value

Stegall claims that he

faith.

it

it is

violates

due process only

t0 evidence that

if

would have

unknown exculpatory

value.

Therefore he had the burden 0f showing bad

faith.

He

could have shown bad faith by

showing

phone

call

knowing that they were denying

him
so.

that the jailers denied his request for a

access to evidence or the ability to timely exercise his right t0 counsel.

Bad

faith

invoking a
failed to

C.

cannot exist Where the state actor was not

right,

To The

is

Of Access To Evidence

(Respondent’s

brief, pp. 9-1 1.)

This

remarkable primarily because the word “spoliation” does not appear once in

the state’s brief.

cases,

State’s Denial

treating “the district court’s decision as a

spoliation claim” rather than a due process issue.

is

Stegall therefore

In This Case

Stegall also contends that the state

argument

was

Violation.

Process Standards Applicable

Apply

did not do

Stegall that he

such as the right to counsel 0r t0 preserve evidence.

show a due process

Due

made aware by

He

and the

(E Appellant’s

state

brief.)

has argued them as such.

Youngblood and Trombetta
(Id.)

are due process

Stegall’s claim that the state is relying

0n “spoliation” and not applicable due process standards

a blatant and obvious

is

misrepresentation.

Nor does
distinguish

Stegall’s distinction

between “spoliation” and “due process” serve

Youngblood and Trombetta from

this case.

Stegall claims those standards

apply only to “evidence already collected,” Whereas his claim
“procedural due process right to a

fair

and

Trombetta

is

an assertion of his

opportunity t0 defend against the State’s

accusations.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 11.) This argument

Youngblood

to

address

is

without merit.

the

constitutional

guarantee

of “access t0 evidence” as a component 0f a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.”

Trombetta, 467 U.S.

Youngblood, 488 U.S.

was

in custody,

Stegall’s liver

at

at

485 (emphasis added,

internal quotation omitted);

55 (same). The entire issue in this case arises only because Stegall

and therefore could not access the evidence Without

was destroying

state cooperation.

That

the evidence through a natural metabolic process does not

change the underlying inquiry of whether the

state

denied him access t0 evidence, or the

underlying requirement for a due process Violation that either the evidence was apparently
exculpatory or the state acted in bad

faith.

Applicable and binding precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States
provides that Where the state has denied a defendant access t0 evidence a due process
Violation results

only under two circumstances: where the evidence

exculpatory or Where the state has acted in bad

him

access to evidence

show

by

that the evidence

faith.

is

Here Stegall claims the

failing t0 grant his requests for a

phone

call.

apparently

state

denied

Stegall did not

he sought (additional blood alcohol testing) was apparently

exculpatory, and the evidence (the state’s

BAC

testing) suggests

it

would not have been.

He

also did not

show

that the state acted in

bad

faith,

because he never alerted anyone that

he was attempting t0 invoke a right such as the right to counsel 0r the statutory right to
independent

Due

testing.

process did not require the jailers to read his mind, and nothing suggests that

a reasonable jailer would have been alerted to the reasons he was requesting to

phone

call.

The

district court’s

W

had apparent exculpatory value or

he was denied access t0 evidence of unknown exculpatory value in bad

and

state respectfully requests the district court’s order

this case

remanded

a

conclusion that Stegall proved his due process rights were

violated without showing either that the evidence

The

make

that

faith is erroneous.

of suppression be reversed

for ﬁlrther proceedings.

DATED this 20th day 0f April, 2020.
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